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IMPLICATIONS OF THE WTO ON THE REDESIGN OF  
U.S. FARM POLICY 
 Introduction
urrent U.S. farm policy expires in 
September 2002. The debate over a 
new farm bill has begun in earnest 
with hearings in the Agriculture Committee 
of the House of Representatives. Commod-
ity groups have begun to present their ideas 
and proposals for policy changes. One rea-
son for this early start to changes in farm 
policy is that many people (both within and 
outside of agriculture) see this year as an 
opportunity to increase agriculture’s base 
federal budget. The opportunity arises both 
because Congress has substantially in-
creased spending on agricultural programs 
the last few years on an emergency basis and 
because the federal budget is running in sur-
plus. Both of these trends are shown in 
Figure 1.  
With each new farm bill, the array of federal 
agricultural programs is modified. New pro-
grams are added while some existing 
programs are changed or eliminated. Individ-
ual programs are designed to address a given 
issue in agriculture. The federal crop insur-
ance program provides producers with 
subsidized insurance for their crop yields 
and/or revenues. Marketing loan programs 
guarantee farmers a minimum price for their 
products. The Production Flexibility Contract 
(PFC) payments provide income support to 
the agricultural sector.  
The emergency agricultural support pack-
ages of the last three years have led many to 
conclude that the current farm program does 
not provide adequate support to farmers and 
that federal agricultural expenditures are too 
low. Thus, many are looking to change the 
existing policy, which was created when the 
federal budget was projected to be in deficit 
spending. The proposed changes range from 
modifications of existing programs to crea-
tion of new ones.  
Much of the discussion thus far has focused 
on the countercyclical nature (or lack 
thereof) of farm programs. Within the cur-
rent programs, the marketing loan and crop 
insurance programs are countercyclical be-
cause expenditures increase in response to a 
decline in either price or yield. Marketing 
loan payments increase with lower prices. 
Crop insurance indemnities accrue when 
yield and/or revenue falls below set levels. 
PFC payments are not countercyclical be-
cause they are fixed throughout the life of 
the program. 
Proposals to increase the loan rates or 
rebalance them (raise some to a level so that 
they are more acreage neutral) have been 
made by at least 20 farm groups and are 
being considered within numerous bills be-
fore Congress (for example, House 
Resolution 32, Senate Bill 20, and Senate 
Bill 165, 107th Congress). Any increase in 
commodity loan rates would increase pro-
gram payments due to low prices. In 
addition, some of the proposals eliminate 
payment limits, thereby further increasing 
program payments. House Resolution 32 
outlines the flexible fallow program (ana-
lyzed in CARD Working Paper 00-WP 263 
C
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Note: The budget surplus numbers are given on the left axis. The agricultural outlays are 
given on the right axis. 
 
FIGURE 1. Federal government budget surplus projections and agricultural outlays 
 
and FAPRI-UMC Report #13-99) where 
producers receive higher loan rates for idling 
a portion of their land.  
The Commission on 21st Century Pro-
duction Agriculture, in its report to 
Congress, proposed a revenue-based coun-
tercyclical federal farm program. The 
proposed program would compare current 
gross income from the eight major crops 
(barley, corn, cotton, oats, rice, sorghum, 
soybeans, and wheat) to a percentage of a 
fixed-base historical income from the same 
crops. Producer eligibility would be deter-
mined by historical production, and 
payments would be based on fixed acreage 
and yields. The Commission’s proposal was 
derived from two earlier proposals, the Sup-
plemental Income Payments (SIP) program, 
introduced by Rep. Stenholm (D-TX) 
(House Resolution 2792, 106th Congress), 
and the Supplemental Income Assistance 
Program (SIAP), put forward by the Clinton 
administration. In these earlier variations, 
program parameters and payments would be 
crop specific. 
Programs to base payments on farm-
level environmental performance have also 
been proposed. The Conservation Security 
Act of 1999 (Senate Bill 1426, 106th Con-
gress) would have provided payments to 
agricultural producers for resource conserva-
tion and livestock nutrient management 
plans. The size of the payments would vary 
according to average land rental rates or live-
stock prices in the region and the practices 
taken by the producer. These payments 
would be capped but would supplement any 
PFC payments the producer receives. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) examined several possible safety 
net programs based on farm income (USDA-
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ERS AER-788). In each of these programs, 
farm households were assured a certain level 
of income. Four different income targets 
were chosen: 
1. the median nonfarm household income 
in the region, 
2. 185 percent of the poverty level, 
3. the average nonfarm household’s     
annual expenditures, and  
4. the income level from the median 
hourly earnings of the nonfarm self-
employed. 
These types of programs have an objec-
tive of providing recipients a minimum 
income level and/or standard of living. 
All of these programs fall under the 
provisions of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The United States is a member of 
the WTO and has committed itself to limit 
its support to industry that affects the trade 
of goods and services. The WTO is the suc-
cessor organization of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
The GATT was established after World War 
II, along with agreements to form other in-
ternational organizations, such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
GATT provided rules on employment, re-
strictive government and business practices, 
investment, and world trade affairs. The 
Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade Ne-
gotiations replaced the GATT institutional 
framework with an official organization (the 
WTO) to oversee international trade issues. 
There are sector-level trade agreements 
within the WTO. Agriculture is one of the 
sectors with such an agreement (often re-
ferred to as URAA for Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture). Under the 
URAA, countries agreed to reduce agricul-
tural protection and support by opening 
domestic markets to import competition and 
by reducing domestic support and export 
subsidies. The market access provisions 
prohibit new nontariff import barriers, con-
vert existing nontariff barriers into tariffs, 
and specify a reduction in tariff levels. The 
export subsidy provisions prohibit new ex-
port subsidies and reduce both the level of 
export subsidies and the quantities exported 
under them. The domestic support provi-
sions target reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic government policies.  
The WTO commitments made by the 
United States are often cited as being an 
important constraint on the design of future 
U.S. farm programs. Indeed the counter-
cyclical policy proposal made by the 21st 
Century Commission on Production 
Agriculture was designed to be “WTO 
compliant.”  But many are confused about 
the U.S. commitments and their future im-
portance. The objective of this paper is to 
fill this gap in understanding by providing a 
detailed explanation of the WTO agreement 
and estimates of whether the United States 
has fully complied with its WTO commit-
ments in recent years. In addition, we 
project the degree of compliance through the 
2002 marketing year. After this projection, 
we examine new alternative program pro-
posals to determine how they might impact 
U.S. compliance.  
We find that the United States has met 
its WTO obligations in recent years.  
Furthermore, given no changes in the current 
policy mix, we project that the U.S. will con-
tinue to meets its commitments. However, 
some new policy proposals could jeopardize 
WTO compliance, particularly if WTO 
members adopt the recent U.S. proposal for 
stricter limits on agricultural support. The 
Proposal for Comprehensive Long-Term 
Agricultural Trade Reform, submitted to the 
WTO by the United States, outlines addi-
tional reductions in trade-distorting practices 
above existing guidelines. 
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 Commitments 
In the URAA, domestic support programs 
and policies are classified by their trade-
distorting effects and their exemption status. 
The classifications are often described in 
terms of colored boxes:  “green” for the least  
trade-distorting programs, “amber” for more 
trade-distorting programs, and “blue” for 
specific programs outlined in the agreement. 
Green and blue box programs are exempt 
from WTO commitments. Amber box pro-
grams may be exempt or may be limited 
under WTO commitments. The analogy of a 
traffic stoplight adequately describes the 
range of domestic support programs under 
the URAA. Countries can continue (“Go”) 
all green and blue box programs at any level 
of funding. Countries may continue to use 
amber box policies as long as the expendi-
tures on them do not exceed set levels 
(“Proceed with caution”). Outlawed policies 
are placed in a “red” box (“Stop”). 
The amber box expenditure limit is 
based on the country’s agricultural support 
over a base period. For the United States, the 
base period covers the years 1986 through 
1988. The value of domestic support in the 
amber box is called the aggregate measure 
of support (AMS). The countries that signed 
the URAA agreed to limit amber box spend-
ing to a level at or below their AMS from 
their base period. Developed countries and 
confederations, such as the United States 
and the European Union, agreed to 20 per-
cent reductions in their AMS limits by 1999. 
The U.S. base period AMS is $23.9 billion. 
The current U.S. AMS limit is $19.1 billion. 
Within the amber box, programs can be ex-
empted from the limits if their AMS 
amounts are considered too small to count. 
These exemptions are referred to as de 
minimis exemptions. 
 
The rules governing the placement of a 
domestic support program in the boxes are 
specific. Blue box policies are production-
limiting policies that base payments on fixed 
yields and acreage. Payments must be limited 
to 85 percent of the base level of production. 
The old U.S. target price-deficiency payment 
program that existed before 1996 was a blue 
box program. Green box policies are policies 
that have minimal trade impacts. Payments 
from green box policies cannot be linked to 
current production and/or prices. The URAA 
lists several types of green box policies and 
the guidelines that must be followed. The 
following program types can qualify for the 
green box: 
1. general services,  
2. public stockholding for food security 
purposes,  
3. domestic food aid,  
4. direct payments to producers,  
5. decoupled income support,  
6. government financial participation in 
income insurance and income safety  
net programs,  
7. payments for relief from natural      
disasters,  
8. structural adjustment assistance       
provided through producer or resource 
retirement programs,  
9. structural adjustment assistance       
provided through investment aids, 
10. payments under environmental         
programs, and  
11. payments under regional assistance 
programs. 
Each of these program types has guide-
lines that define the eligibility of the 
program for the green box. Any direct pay-
ments to producers provided by a 
government program cannot involve trans-
fers from consumers (only from taxpayers). 
Thus, green box programs cannot support  
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prices. The guidelines for decoupled income 
support are as follows: 
1. eligibility for the program must be 
based on clearly defined criteria over a 
fixed base period; 
2. payment amounts cannot be related to 
production, prices, or input usage after 
the base period; and 
3. no production can be required to receive 
payments. 
For government-provided income insur-
ance or safety net programs to be green box, 
the requirements are as follows: 
1. income and income loss can only be 
from agricultural sources; 
2. loss must exceed 30 percent of average 
gross income (or an equivalent amount 
of net income) where average income is 
determined by a three-year average    
income (from the previous three years) 
or a five-year “olympic” average in-
come (removing the high and low years 
before averaging); and 
3. if payments are provided by this      
program and a natural disaster relief 
program, the total amount of payments 
cannot exceed 100 percent of the pro-
ducer’s total loss. 
The requirements for natural disaster 
relief are as follows: 
1. eligibility is determined by a formal  
disaster announcement from the gov-
ernment with at least a 30 percent 
production loss based on average pro-
duction (the previous three-year average 
or the five-year “olympic” average); 
2. payments may only be made on losses 
due to the disaster; 
3. payments cannot be for more than the 
amount of loss and requirements for   
future production; and  
4. if payments are provided by this pro-
gram and a natural disaster relief 
program, the total amount of payments 
cannot exceed 100 percent of the pro-
ducer’s total loss. 
Producer retirement programs qualify 
for exemption if eligibility for the program 
is clearly defined on criteria to transition the 
producer out of agricultural production, and 
the payments are conditional on complete 
retirement from agricultural production. 
Resource retirement programs qualify under 
the following stipulations: 
1. payments are conditional on the       
resource staying out of agricultural    
production for at least three years; 
2. requirements cannot be placed on    
alternative use of the resource or other 
resources employed in agricultural   
production; and  
3. payments cannot be related to any    
remaining agricultural production in 
which the producer is involved. 
Environmental program payments 
qualify for the green box exemption if eli-
gibility requirements are clearly defined 
and dependent on specific conditions, pos-
sibly involving production inputs or 
practices, and if the payment is limited to 
the extra cost or income loss the producer 
faces to be in compliance. Programs that fit 
these general types, but fail to meet the 
exemption conditions, and all other domes-
tic support programs would fall into the 
amber box and would possibly be limited 
under the URAA. 
Amber box policies can still be ex-
empted from the AMS counted against a 
country’s limit if the policy is termed de 
minimis. For developed countries, a 5 per-
cent rule is used. For crop- or product-
specific support, a policy can be declared de 
minimis if the expenditures under the policy 
are less than 5 percent of the value of pro-
duction for the commodity. For non-crop- or 
non-product-specific support, all such poli-
cies can be declared de minimis if total 
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expenditures under all of the policies are 
less than 5 percent of the total value of agri-
cultural production in the country. 
 
What Boxes for Current 
 Programs? 
The WTO agreements have had and will con-
tinue to have effects on U.S. farm policy. The 
1996 farm bill and any future farm bills fall 
under the requirement of the URAA and any 
successor agreements. To see how current 
U.S. farm programs fare under the URAA, 
we examine the classification of U.S. farm 
programs and why the programs are classi- 
fied as they are. Countries typically submit  
reports on overall domestic support two to 
three years after the fact. The United States 
has submitted reports for the 1995-1997 
marketing years. For current policies that 
were in place at that time, we can place them 
in the WTO boxes based on these submis-
sions. For current policies created after 
1997, we will place the policies based on 
our interpretation of the URAA. Other inter-
pretations are possible. 
Current green box domestic support 
comes from several of the program types 
discussed in the previous section. General 
service programs include the Agricultural 
Research Service; the Tennessee Valley 
Authority; the Cooperative State Research, 
Extension, and Education Service; the Rural 
Business and Cooperative Development 
Service; the Animal and Plant Health In-
spection Service; the Grain Inspection, 
Packers, and Stockyard Administration; the 
Food Safety Inspection Service; the Agricul-
tural Marketing Service; the Economic 
Research Service; the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service; and the National Resource 
Conservation Service. These programs com-
bined for nearly $7 billion in domestic 
support in 1997. Domestic food aid ac-
counted for nearly $36 billion in 1997, with 
most of this total being in the food stamp 
and child nutrition programs. 
PFC payments also are green box, as 
they are classified as decoupled income  
support. The construction of the PFC pro-
gram follows the guidelines of a decoupled 
income support program that qualifies for 
exemption. Payment eligibility and amounts 
are based on historical production over a 
base period. Current production decisions 
(even the decision not to produce at all) can-
not affect the payment. Given that there is 
no link between current production and PFC 
payments, these payments should have no 
effect on future production and therefore are 
not trade distorting. 
Green box natural disaster relief pro-
grams include the Non-insured Crop Disaster 
Assistance Program, the Livestock Indemnity 
Program, and emergency feed and forage 
programs. The Conservation Reserve       
Program qualifies as a resource retirement 
program. Programs that facilitate structural 
adjustment through investment aids include 
the Farm Credit Program and State Mediation 
Grants. Environmental programs that qualify 
for exemption include the Agricultural and 
Emergency Conservation Programs, the 
Great Plains Conservation Program, the   
Water Bank Program, the Wetland Reserve 
Program, and the Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program. 
The United States has increased its 
green box spending by a large amount over 
the past several years. Over the period 
1986-1988, total expenditures for programs 
that would have qualified for the green box 
were, on average, just over $26 billion. In 
1996 and 1997, green box spending in-
creased to over $51 billion. Because the 
green box spending is exempt from WTO 
limits, the United States can continue to 
add to this total. 
It is in amber box spending that the 
United States could run afoul of the WTO 
and the URAA. Amber box spending is lim-
WTO and Redesign of U.S. Farm Policy / 7 
  
ited under the URAA, and the United States, 
as a developed country, has agreed to reduce 
such spending by 20 percent from its 1986-
1988 average. This implies that the United 
States can spend up to $19.1 billion on am-
ber box programs. Figure 2 shows the AMS 
limits, actual AMS amounts for 1996 and 
1997, and our projections for AMS amounts 
for 1998 to 2002. Our projections are based 
on USDA figures on various program ex-
penditures for 1998-2001, where possible, 
and USDA and Food and Agricultural Pol-
icy Research Institute (FAPRI) projections 
for 2002 figures when actual data could not 
be obtained.  
AMS is separated into product-specific 
and non-product-specific categories for the 
calculation of de minimis exemptions. In 
1996 and 1997, the United States reported 
the following program payments or costs as 
product-specific domestic support:  the 
dairy, sugar, and peanut price support/quota 
programs; marketing loan gains; loan defi-
ciency payments; commodity loan forfeiture 
costs; cotton user marketing payments; dairy 
indemnities; mohair and wool support pay-
ments; rice marketing certificate payments; 
tobacco price related payments; commodity 
storage payments; and commodity loan in-
terest subsidies. Over the same time period, 
the United States reported these non-
product-specific domestic support payments:  
estimated water subsidies from several Bu-
reau of Reclamation projects, net federal 
outlays for livestock grazing on federal land, 
net crop insurance indemnities (insurance 
payments less producer-paid premiums) for 
both yield and revenue insurance policies, 
and state credit programs. 
Marketing loan gains, loan deficiency 
payments, commodity storage payments, and 
commodity loan interest subsidies arise from 
the marketing loan programs. The price sup-
port and marketing loan program 
expenditures are classified as amber box 
because payments depend on current produc-
tion and prices. Given this link, the programs 
can influence future production decisions 
and have trade-distorting effects. Net crop 
insurance indemnities are also in the amber 
box because they do not meet the green box 
requirements. The yield and revenue insur-
ance policies are not income insurance 
policies; coverage above 70 percent is al-
lowed; and the government does not have to 
declare a disaster for payments to begin. 
Thus, this insurance cannot qualify as green 
box either as an income safety net program 
or as a natural disaster relief program. 
Over the last three years, the federal 
government has augmented agricultural 
spending with emergency assistance pack-
ages. These packages included market loss 
assistance (MLA) and crop loss assistance 
payments for several commodities. The crop 
loss assistance payments were constructed to 
follow the guidelines for a natural disaster 
relief program and are exempt from WTO 
limits (that is, they are green box). The mar-
ket loss assistance payments follow the same 
payment formula as the PFC payment (which 
are green box), but the justification for the 
payments was the low market prices we have 
seen over the last few years. Therefore, we 
assume that the market loss assistance pay-
ments fall into the amber box because the 
payments were triggered by (then) current 
market prices. The payment structure of the 
market loss assistance programs is non-
product-specific because current production 
has no impact on the payments. 
Other arguments could lead to the mar-
ket loss assistance payments being classified 
differently. Because the payment rates are 
crop-specific, it could be argued that the 
MLA payments are product-specific (but still 
within the amber box). Under this scenario, 
the MLA payments for each crop would be 
compared to the value of the individual crops 
rather than to the total value of agricultural 
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Note: Actual numbers are reported for 1996 and 1997. Projections are made for 1998 
and beyond. 
 
FIGURE 2. Total amber box spending, payment caps, and de minimis exclusions 
 
production. This classification would lead to 
higher AMS amounts for the United States, 
adding enough to the AMS total to exceed 
the limits in 1999 and 2000. It could also be 
argued that PFC payments (green box) and 
MLA payments should be classified the same 
way. There is no formula linking the MLA 
payments to current market prices. Any link 
from the MLA payments to current prices is 
derived from interpreting the intent of the 
U.S. Congress. If this argument held, then the 
MLA payments would be classified as green 
box and would be exempt from the WTO 
limits in the URAA. The main difference, as 
far as AMS amounts, between this classifica-
tion and the one we assume is that the MLA 
payments could count toward the AMS limits 
under our assumptions, but they could not 
count if they are considered green box. This 
shows that even with the specific guidelines 
in the URAA, arguments can be made to 
place the same program in different boxes. 
Table 1 displays the actual and pro-
jected values of production used in this 
analysis. The overall value of agricultural 
production has fallen since 1996. By 1999, 
the value of agricultural production had 
dropped to $183 billion, nearly $23 billion 
less than the 1996 value. The projections 
indicate that production values have in-
creased and will continue to do so. By 2002, 
agricultural production will be valued at 
$199 billion. These production values affect 
the U.S. WTO standing as they are used to 
evaluate U.S. domestic support versus the 
AMS limit. The de minimis exemptions are 
determined by comparing domestic support 
against 5 percent of the production value.
WTO and Redesign of U.S. Farm Policy / 9 
  
TABLE 1. Value of production 
Commodity 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 ($ Billion) 
Barley 1,091 862 687 553 632 740 760 
Beef and Veal 22,259 24,893 24,153 25,961 29,175 30,436 30,715 
Corn 25,312 22,352 18,922 17,950 18,621 19,930 20,895 
Cottonseed 915 835 687 562 677 683 676 
Cotton 6,408 5,976 4,120 3,836 4,781 4,962 4,872 
Dairy 23,057 21,191 24,520 23,602 20,889 21,536 20,730 
Honey 180 148 147 125 151 151 151 
Canola 62 88 160 107 135 138 140 
Flaxseed 10 14 34 31 35 36 37 
Mustard 2 9 11 5 4 4 4 
Rapeseed 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Safflower 76 60 58 55 30 30 31 
Sunflower 418 427 537 353 241 246 250 
Mohair 15 15 13 10 11 14 14 
Oats 319 273 200 170 165 160 156 
Peanut 1,030 1,003 1,126 992 845 1,012 1,028 
Rice 1,687 1,756 1,687 1,257 1,073 1,239 1,339 
Rye 33 30 30 25 21 23 24 
Sorghum 2,004 1,409 905 971 823 1,038 1,060 
Soybean 17,455 17,373 13,494 12,451 13,073 13,345 13,543 
Sugar 2,044 2,050 2,242 2,092 2,179 2,204 2,120 
Tobacco 2,852 3,217 2,701 2,329 2,056 1,512 1,920 
Wheat 9,815 8,287 6,781 5,904 5,970 6,345 6,609 
Wool 40 45 29 18 15 32 32 
All Other  
 Commodities 88,614 91,571 87,746 83,947 89,783 91,908 92,229 
        
Total 205,701 203,884 190,991 183,309 191,387 197,726 199,336 
 
Table 2 shows all of the amber box ex-
penditures before the de minimis exemptions 
are taken. These figures represent all possible 
expenditures that could count against the 
WTO limits. In 1996 and 1997, over $7 bil-
lion was spent on amber box programs. As 
prices deteriorated, marketing loan expendi-
tures (loan deficiency payments, marketing 
loan gains, and commodity loan interest sub-
sidies) grew. Market loss assistance 
payments were also appropriated. Thus, in 
1998, amber box spending rose to $14 bil-
lion. In 1999 and 2000, spending rose to over 
$21 billion. With projections of stronger 
prices and no additional market loss assis-
tance, total amber box outlays are expected to 
fall to under $13 billion in 2001. By 2002, 
changes in the dairy programs are scheduled 
to take effect and reinforce the decline in 
spending. Outlays are projected to fall to $7 
billion in 2002.  
Table 3 shows the expenditures that 
count against the U.S. AMS limit. The 
de minimis exemptions offset a sizable por-
tion of the increase in amber box spending. In 
10 / Hart and Babcock 
TABLE 2. Aggregate measures of support (before de minimis exemptions) 
Commodity 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 ($ billion) 
Barley 1 4 85 40 69 26 34 
Beef and Veal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corn 28 150 1,557 2,541 2,416 520 0 
Cottonseed 0 0 0 79 100 0 0 
Cotton 3 466 867 2,033 465 264 170 
Dairy 4,691 4,456 4,431 4,253 4,931 4,318 1 
Honey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canola 0 0 9 39 77 92 90 
Flaxseed 0 0 2 11 23 28 28 
Mustard 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Rapeseed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Safflower 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 
Sunflower 0 0 23 141 138 160 157 
Mohair 0 0 1 0 6 10 0 
Oats 0 0 20 29 42 34 14 
Peanut 299 306 264 322 330 268 267 
Rice 6 6 42 438 440 573 542 
Rye 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghum 1 2 63 154 82 13 0 
Soybean 14 45 1,317 2,845 2,817 2,971 2,917 
Sugar 908 1,012 1,052 1,136 1,060 1,022 1,042 
Tobacco -6 18 3 330 342 1 2 
Wheat 8 36 527 958 848 130 61 
Wool 0 0 0 0 5 10 0 
Non-Product- 
 Specific 1,115 563 4,010 7,451 6,954 2,219 2,124 
        
Total 7,068 7,064 14,271 22,802 21,148 12,659 7,447 
 
 
1996 and 1997, the U.S. AMS was 
roughly $6 billion, with most of this sup-
port going to dairy producers. Only three 
products received enough support in 
1996 to exceed the de minimis exemption 
level. By 1999, 17 products had support 
exceeding the de minimis exemption 
level, and the AMS had risen to over $15 
billion. This amounts to 75 percent of the 
U.S. AMS limit. If the market loss assis-
tance had counted as product-specific, 
the United States would have exceeded 
the AMS limit in 1999 and 2000. For 
2001 and 2002, because prices are pro-
jected to rise, so do production values 
and de minimis exemption limits. This 
means that more spending could qualify 
for exemption. But increasing prices also 
implies smaller marketing loan outlays 
and reduced amber box spending. By 
2002, the U.S. AMS is projected to fall to 
nearly $5 billion.   
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TABLE 3. Aggregate measures of support (after de minimis exemptions) 
Commodity 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 ($ billion) 
Barley 0 0 85 40 69 0 0 
Beef and Veal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corn 0 0 1,557 2,541 2,416 0 0 
Cottonseed 0 0 0 79 100 0 0 
Cotton 0 466 867 2,033 465 264 0 
Dairy 4,691 4,456 4,431 4,253 4,931 4,318 0 
Honey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canola 0 0 9 39 77 92 90 
Flaxseed 0 0 2 11 23 28 28 
Mustard 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Rapeseed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Safflower 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sunflower 0 0 0 141 138 160 157 
Mohair 0 0 0 0 6 10 0 
Oats 0 0 20 29 42 34 14 
Peanut 299 306 264 322 330 268 267 
Rice 0 0 0 438 440 573 542 
Rye 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghum 0 0 63 154 82 0 0 
Soybean 0 0 1,317 2,845 2,817 2,971 2,917 
Sugar 908 1,012 1,052 1,136 1,060 1,022 1,042 
Tobacco 0 0 0 330 342 0 0 
Wheat 0 0 527 958 848 0 0 
Wool 0 0 0 0 5 10 0 
Non-Product- 
 Specific 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Total 5,898 6,238 10,193 15,350 14,192 9,751 5,055 
 
 
What Box for Proposed 
 Programs? 
Adjustments to the farm bill will need to be 
examined to see where they fit within the 
URAA and to fully consider their impact on 
the U.S. AMS. Policies that increase or re-
balance the marketing loan rates may change 
programs that are already marked as product-
specific amber box spending. Given the price 
projections for 2001 and 2002, these changes 
would likely lead to a higher AMS and push 
the United States even closer to its AMS 
limit. The flexible fallow program would also 
be considered product-specific amber box 
spending, even though it has production-
limiting features (like blue box programs) 
because the payments are triggered by cur-
rent prices and are not limited to 85 percent 
or less of some base level of production. 
The SIP and SIAP proposals are prod-
uct-specific amber box programs because 
payments are triggered by shortfalls in cur-
rent prices or production. The Commission 
on 21st Century Production Agriculture’s 
countercyclical proposal is non-product-
specific, as it looks at income across eight 
12 / Hart and Babcock 
crops. But our interpretation of the URAA 
indicates that it also would be considered 
amber box because current prices and pro-
duction from the eight crops are used to 
determine the overall amount of payments. 
In fact, the URAA guidelines for the exemp-
tion of decoupled income support exclude 
any countercyclical program based on cur-
rent prices or production. 
New policies that include environmental 
payments could also fall into the amber box 
if the payment exceeds the additional cost or 
loss of income that producers face in imple-
menting the requirements of the program. 
The farm income safety net programs, exam-
ined by the USDA, would fail to qualify for 
the green box. The guidelines for income 
safety net programs explicitly outline the  
income levels that can be supported and the 
distribution of the payments. None of the 
income programs follow this outline. 
Most current proposals keep the exist-
ing marketing loan, crop insurance, and PFC 
programs in place. This implies that any 
additional expenditures from these proposals 
would add to the U.S. amber box spending 
and possibly to the U.S. AMS (barring de 
minimis exemptions). Therefore, the prob-
ability that the U.S. will exceed its WTO 
domestic support limit increases under these 
proposals. For example, if the SIP proposal 
with a 95 percent coverage level had been in 
place instead of the Market Loss Assistance 
payments, then the United States would 
have exceeded the amber box spending caps. 
Figure 3 shows the estimated payments and.
 
Note: Actual numbers are reported for 1996 and 1997. Projections are made for 1998 
and beyond. 
 
FIGURE 3. Total amber box spending with a 95 percent SIP program 
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the extent to which we would have exceeded 
the limits. 
As the URAA now stands, the goal of 
having a new countercyclical farm program 
conflicts with the goal of reducing trade-
distorting policies. Most variations on a 
countercyclical farm program would fail to 
qualify for a green box exemption due to 
their very nature. After all, how can a pro-
gram be countercyclical if it cannot be 
based on current prices and yields?  Efforts 
to construct a countercyclical farm program 
that is green box would require a redefini-
tion of the meaning of “countercyclical.”  
Adding a new amber box countercyclical 
program might require the elimination of 
one or more existing policies. Such a move 
could be justified because both the price 
support programs and the crop insurance 
programs provide countercyclical support. 
A new program could, depending on its 
design, substitute quite effectively for ei-
ther program (Hart and Babcock).  
 
Concluding Comments 
In June of 2000, the United States proposed 
an extension to the URAA that builds on its 
reform measures. The proposal would sim-
plify the policy classifications, narrowing 
them to two: exempt and nonexempt poli-
cies. AMS levels would again be reduced, 
with the final level determined by a fixed 
percentage of the country’s total value of 
agricultural production in a fixed base pe-
riod. The percentage would be the same for 
 all participating countries. Exemption re-
quirements would be rewritten to emphasize 
the limiting of trade-distorting practices. 
Criteria for the exemption of programs   
essential to food security and development 
in developing countries would be added. 
The reasoning behind this proposal is 
that it is both in our national and global 
interest to expand agricultural trade. By  
removing trade-distorting domestic sup-
port policies, countries are allowing 
agricultural producers to base production 
decisions on market and environmental 
signals. This will expand economic oppor-
tunity for the agricultural sectors while 
addressing food security and environ-
mental concerns. Consumers will also 
benefit through more competitive prices 
and a wider array of products. 
This official stance of U.S. trade nego-
tiators clearly is not shared by U.S. domestic 
concerns whose advocates propose to sig-
nificantly expand U.S. support for ariculture. 
Much of the proposed support would count 
against the WTO commitments made by the 
United States. A clear understanding of what 
those obligations are and how new policy 
proposals fit into the WTO framework is 
critical for all concerned as the United States 
tries to revamp its farm programs while 
maintaining its overall commitment to ex-
panded trade.




Ackerman, K.Z., K.J. Brosch, G. Hasha, D.R. Kelch, S. Leetmaa, P. Liapis, M.L. Madell, F.J. Nelson, D.  
Roberts, R. Schnepf, M. Simone, D. Skully, C. Valdes, J. Wainio, and C.E. Young. 1998. Agriculture 
in the WTO: Situation and Outlook Series. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Ser-
vice WRS-98-4, Washington, D.C. 
 http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/erssor/international/wrs-bb/1998/wto/wrs98-4.pdf 
Babcock, B.A. 2000. “The Regional Distribution of Farm-Level Impacts from Acreage Set-Asides.”  
CARD Working Paper 00-WP 263, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State    
University. http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/texts/00wp263.pdf 
Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture. 2001. Directions for Future Farm Policy: The Role 
of Government in Support of Production Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: The Commission on 21st 
Century Production Agriculture. 
 http://www.usda.gov/oce/21st-century/report.pdf 
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI). 1999. “FAPRI Analysis of the Flexible Fallow  
Program.” FAPRI-UMC Report # 13-99, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, University      
of Missouri. http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/Publications/FlexFallowProg/FlxFaloDoc.pdf 
Hart, C.E., and B.A. Babcock. 1999. “Countercyclical Agricultural Program Payments: Is It Time to Look 
at Revenue?” CARD Briefing Paper 99-BP 28, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa 
State University.  
 http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/texts/99bp28 revised.pdf 
Gundersen, C., M. Morehart, L. Whitener, L. Ghelfi, J. Johnson, K. Kassel, B. Kuhn, A. Mishra, S. Offutt, 
and L. Tiehen. 2000. A Safety Net for Farm Households. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service AER 788, Washington, D.C. 
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer788/aer788.pdf 
Office of Management and Budget. 2001a. A Blueprint for New Beginnings—A Responsible Budget for      
America’s Priorities. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President of the United States,      
Office of Management and Budget. 
 http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2002/pdf/blueprnt.pdf (Also available at http://www.card.iastate. 
edu/publications/texts/blueprint.pdf) 
 
_______________. 2001b. FY 2002 Economic Outlook, Highlights from FY 1994 to FY 2001, FY 2002 
Baseline Projections. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President of the United States, Of-
fice of Management and Budget. 
 http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2002/pdf/economic.pdf (Also available at http://www.card. 
 iastate.edu/publications/texts/economic.pdf) 
Office of the United States Trade Representative. 1997. Notification. Submitted to the World Trade    
Organization, Committee on Agriculture. 
 http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/AG/NUSA10.WPF (February 27, 2001). (Also avail-




WTO and Redesign of U.S. Farm Policy / 15 
 
  
_______________. 1998. Notification. Submitted to the World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture.  
 http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/AG/NUSA17.DOC (February 27, 2001). (Also available at 
 http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/texts/G-AG-N-USA-17.pdf) 
_______________. 1999. Notification. Submitted to the World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture.  
 http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/AG/NUSA27.DOC (February 27, 2001). (Also available at 
 http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/texts/G-AG-N-USA-27.pdf) 
_______________. 2000. Proposal for Comprehensive Long-Term Agricultural Trade Reform: Submission 
from the United States. Submitted to the World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special 
Session. 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/AG/NGW15.DOC (February 27, 2001). (Also available at 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/texts/G-AG-NG-W-15.pdf) 
United States Congress. 1999a. Conservation Security Act of 1999. Senate Bill 1426, 106th Congress.        
Sponsored by Senators Harkin, Daschle, Leahy, Kerrey, Conrad, and Johnson.  
 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:S.1426: (February 27, 2001). 
_______________. 1999b. Supplemental Income Payments for Farmers Act. House Resolution 2792, 106th 
Congress. Sponsored by Representative Stenholm.  
 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:H.R.2792: (February 28, 2001). 
_______________. 2001a. Family Agriculture Recovery and Market (FARM) Equity Act of 2001. Senate Bill 
165, 107th Congress. Sponsored by Senator Dorgan.  
 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:S.165: (February 27, 2001). 
_______________. 2001b. Food Security and Land Stewardship Act of 2001. House Resolution 32, 107th  
Congress. Sponsored by Representatives Bereuter and Schaffer. 
 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:H.R.32: (February 27, 2001). 
_______________. 2001c. Securing a Future for Independent Agriculture Act of 2001. Senate Bill 20, 107th 
Congress. Sponsored by Senators Daschle, Harkin, Leahy, Johnson, Baucus, Rockefeller, Kohl, 
Wellstone, Dorgan, Durbin, Conrad, Kerry, Carnahan, Dayton, Kennedy, and Akaka. 
 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:S.20: (February 27, 2001). 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Communications. 2000. The Clinton Administration’s Proposal for 
Improving the Farm Safety Net. Office of Communications, Washington, D.C. 
 http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2000/02/5001.htm (March 5, 2001). 
Wiesemeyer, J. 2001. “Inside Washington Today: Farm Program Spending: How Much? Subsidize Anything 
and You Get More of It.” AgWeb.com. 
 http://www.agweb.com/news show news article.asp?file=AgNewsArticle 200122213565411 
&newscat=AW (February 22, 2001). 
World Trade Organization. 1994. “Agreement on Agriculture.” In The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts, pp. 43-47, Geneva, Switzerland. 
 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf. (Also available at http://www.card.iastate. 
 edu/publications/texts/Agreement on Agriculture.pdf) 
 
 
